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Introduction 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and its extensions symbolise everything that 
is wrong with academic finance: models of financial markets and asset prices, the 
econometric testing of these models, and the perceived practical significance of the 
models. Despite the global financial crisis, and the devastation it has inflicted on 
countries and individuals, it is still “business as usual” for the true believers—those 
who think that markets cannot fail and that finance is like physics, a science that can 
produce reliable predictive models. Hundreds of papers have been written on the 
CAPM and its variants/extensions, but little concern has been expressed about the 
tendency of finance academics to squander a big portion of their intellectual capital on 
this endeavour. 
 
This is why Dempsey’s paper in this issue of this journal (Dempsey, 2012) is timely. 
He makes a number of interesting points that challenge the orthodoxy of the Chicago 
economics, including the CAPM foundation that markets are fundamentally rational 
and the proposition that the CAPM is a “revolutionary idea” that is associated with the 
other “revolutionary idea” of the efficient market hypothesis. He correctly argues that 
the CAPM has failed as a paradigm for asset pricing and discredits the idea that 
finance is a subject that is worthy of or suitable for “scientific enquiry”. Another 
interesting point raised by Dempsey is that the continued defence of the CAPM by the 
true believers has led to the addition of other explanatory variables to the underlying 
model, without any explicit theory or even intuition, in an attempt to salvage the 
model typically through data mining. Dempsey reaches important conclusions. For 
example, he concludes that “the paradigm of the CAPM and efficient markets may 
need to be replaced with a paradigm of markets as vulnerable to capricious 
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behaviour”. He also concludes that “in a non-CAPM world, the practitioner needs to 
understand how markets function in disequilibrium, as well as in equilibrium, with the 
caveat that history never repeats itself”. The objective of this note is to evaluate and 
elaborate on the points raised by Dempsey.  
 
The Failure of CAPM 
Dempsey (2012) argues that the CAPM has failed as a paradigm for asset pricing—he 
is not alone in (correctly) thinking that way. The recognition of the failure of the 
CAPM comes after long years during which the model dominated financial economics 
to the extent that it has become to be known as “the paradigm” (Ross, 1978; Ryan, 
1982). The model has been and is still used for estimating the cost of capital, 
evaluating the performance of managed portfolios, and for investment purposes.  
 
The CAPM has failed the test of reality. Fama and French (2004) argue that “the 
empirical record of the CAPM is poor enough to invalidate the way it is used in 
applications”. The poor empirical performance of the CAPM may be a reflection of 
theoretical loopholes, simplifying assumptions and perhaps the difficulty of 
implementing a valid test (for example, the difficulty of constructing a market 
portfolio). The model is based on some assumptions that are truly ludicrous: no 
commissions, no bid-ask spreads, no taxes, investors view stocks only in a mean-
variance space along the lines suggested by Markowitz (1952), and that investors can 
take any position without affecting the market price. These points have been discussed 
repeatedly in the literature, so I will not re-iterate. 
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The CAPM stipulates that the expected return on an asset is linearly related to its beta 
only, thus excluding other potential explanatory variables. For me it stretches the 
imagination to suggest that a simple equation can explain the return on a stock on the 
basis of its beta, a measure of systematic risk. Beta itself is a useful concept, telling us 
how the stock is related to the overall market—hence it gives a reasonable portfolio 
management tip: if you expect the market to go up you should increase the number of 
high-beta stocks, and vice versa. To contend that beta alone can tell us what the 
expected return should be is far off the mark. A serious flaw of this conjecture is the 
proposition that market participants think exactly in the same way, paying attention to 
nothing but beta. The Economist (2011) correctly argues that “the problem is not just 
that investors do not know how the fundamentals… will develop” but also that “they 
do not know which other investors will choose to focus on”. 
 
Fama and French (1993, 1996) found that betas alone cannot explain cross-sectional 
differences in stock returns—this is the same Fama who used to be enthusiastic about 
the CAPM (Fama and MacBeth, 1973). On the basis of their results, Fama and French 
pronounced the death of the CAPM, but there seems to be some sort of ambivalence 
about whether the Fama-French model is a replacement for or an extension of the 
CAPM. Dempsey’s comments on how the CAPM relates to the Fama-French model 
exhibit this ambivalence. On the one hand, he is bewildered by the Fama-French 
denouncement of beta in combination with their inclusion of beta as an explanatory 
variable in their model. On the other hand, he argues that “the Fama and French three-
factor model has made beta redundant as an explanatory variable, which makes sense 
given their studies confirming that beta has little or no explanatory power”. 
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Lai (2011) comes to the strong but justifiable conclusion that the CAPM is a 
“tautology rather than an asset pricing model”. He uses mathematical reasoning to 
conclude that “the CAPM is useless and doomed for predicting the rate of return in 
the real world”. Efforts to salvage the CAPM have not changed the fact that the model 
is theoretically bankrupt, empirically unsupported, and practically useless at best and 
misleading at worst. 
 
The Failure of EMH and REH 
Dempsey (2012) criticises the CAPM foundation that markets are fundamentally 
rational, thus casting doubt on the related  “revolutionary” ideas of  the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH) and the rational expectations hypothesis (REH). These 
hypotheses constitute gross misrepresentation of the facts on the ground.  
 
As Dempsey (2012) argues, the efficient market hypothesis is claimed to be the most 
extensively tested hypothesis (for example, Smith 1990). Jensen (1978) went as far as 
claiming that “there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid 
empirical evidence supporting it than the efficient market hypothesis”. The EMH, 
developed by Fama (1970), stipulates that financial prices reflect all the available 
information relevant to the values of the underlying assets, which means that the price 
of an asset converges on its value fairly quickly. Interestingly, although Fama has 
undergone a change of heart with respect to the EMH, he never acknowledged the 
failure of the hypothesis while enthusiastically declaring the death of the CAPM.  
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To its benefit, and the detriment of the rest of the economy, the finance industry 
interpreted the EMH, with the help and encouragement of academia, to imply that the 
market is capable of pricing financial assets correctly and that deviations from 
fundamental values could not persist. The development of “financial engineering” was 
propelled by the EMH, in the sense that any complex security can be priced correctly 
through the market mechanism of arbitrage. As a result, financial sector gurus 
convinced politicians, regulators and investors that what they were doing was in the 
interest of the economy as they found alternative investment outlets and means of risk 
management—actually they produced various means for boosting risk as opposed to 
managing it.  
 
The global financial crisis has dealt a severe blow, not only to the EMH but to the 
whole discipline of financial economics—neoclassical financial economics, to be 
precise. According to Harper and Thomas (2009), who were referring to what 
happened during the global financial crisis, “the disappearance of buyers…. from 
major financial markets, especially over-the-counter markets for derivatives, 
reinforces disaffection with Efficient Market Theory”. Quiggin (2009) points out that 
“the failure of the efficient markets hypothesis will have ramifications throughout 
economics and finance, and will require a thorough rethinking of the analysis of 
financial regulation”. Fox (2009) declares the triumph of the efficient market’s critics 
“by showing why traditional market forces can sometimes be just as pervasive as the 
rational ones”. Unfortuantely, The Economist (2011) is correct in arguing that “the 
efficient market hypothesis, like a Hollywood monster, has proven very hard to kill 
off”. 
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The REH was developed by Thomas Sargent and Robert Lucas from the original 
sound idea of Muth (1961) (see, for example, Sargent, 1987). The problem with the 
REH is that it is plainly counter-factual, as it precludes heterogeneity in favour of 
some “representative agent”, which is inherent in asset pricing models. The literature 
disputes the validity of the representative agent hypothesis, rejecting it in favour of 
heterogeneity, on the grounds that the former is inconsistent with observed trading 
behaviour and the existence of speculative markets. Indeed, it is arguable that there is 
no incentive to trade if all market participants are identical with respect to 
information, endowments and trading strategies. 
 
Finance as a Science 
Dempsey (2012) argues that “by the late 1950s, the prestige of the natural sciences 
had encouraged the belief that the modelling of decision-making and resource 
allocation problems could be identified through the elaboration of optimisation 
models and the general extension of techniques from applied mathematics”. 
Economics and finance are allegedly similar to physics, where behaviour is governed 
by laws and financial markets are like physical systems—by pushing a button the 
market moves in one direction rather than the other. This belief has led to the 
excessive and unnecessary mathematisation of economics and finance and the 
production of fancy but unrealistic models (including the CAPM).  
 
The contribution of mathematics to finance has been hailed as a positive development. 
For example, Stuparu and Daniasa (2009) argue that “increasing activity in financial 
markets (particularly in derivatives trading) is goverened by mathematical models”, as 
if the mushrooming of trading in toxic assets has been a positive development. In 
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reality, however, excessive mathematisation of economics and finance has resulted in 
work that has no relevance to reality. Vellupillai (2005) demonstrates that 
“mathematical economics is unreasonably ineffective… because the mathematical 
assumptions are economically unwarranted; ineffective because the mathematical 
formalisations imply non-constructive and uncomputable structures”. Likewise, Pani 
(2003) argues that “if we look beyond individual models to the actual practice of 
mathematical economics the role that subjective judgments play becomes quite 
evident”.  
 
Referring to economics, or rather neoclassical economics, Horn (2009) argues that 
“we are witnessing the dismantling of an approach that, at least in its shallow 
mainstream version, has to make a series of absurd assumptions in order to reach any 
conclusion—with both the assumptions and the conclusions being astonishingly out of 
touch with reality. This is what the CAPM, EMH and REH are all about: incredible 
assumptions. 
 
Econometric Loopholes: Dodgy Techniques and Data Mining  
Econometrics was originally developed to serve as a means to an end: the means 
whereby economic and financial relations are estimated and tested. It has, however, 
become an end itself as we have witnessed a proliferation of econometric methods 
that add no value to the process of investigation. This is why van Meerhaeghe (1986) 
argues that “many econometrists [sic] are no longer interested in measurement, but in 
art for art’s sake”. He correctly concludes that econometrics has become abstract 
mathematisation. 
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Number crunching has overwhelmed our understating of financial markets with the 
development of the gimmicks of financial econometrics. Some elaborate models have 
been developed, including ARMA, ARIMA, ARFIMA, TAR and SETAR models. 
We also have neural networks, wavelet analysis and multi-chain Markov switching 
models. The Nobel Prize was awarded to Robert Engle for inventing ARCH models, 
which are designed to explain and predict financial volatility, but things did not stop 
there. There have been more sequels to ARCH than to Jaws, Rocky, Rambo and Die 
Hard put together. These sequels include GARCH, EGARCH, XARCH and 
XYARCH where X and Y can be replaced by any letter of the alphabet. Moosa 
(2011a, 2011b) demonstrates the failure of financial econometrics by showing that 
model sophistication does not make any difference for hedging effectiveness and that 
cointegration analysis does not tell us anything over and above what we learn from 
simple correlation analysis. 
 
The biggest problem with the econometrics of asset pricing models is that cross-
sectional analysis is conducive to data mining, a problem that Dempsey (2012) refers 
to explicitly. Subrahmanyam (2010) argues that “our learning about the cross-section 
is hampered when so many predictive variables accumulate without any 
understanding of the correlation structure between the variables” and that “the 
tendency of scholars to use one methodology or the other raises the question of 
whether the results are robust to different methodology”. He is very sceptical about 
the robustness of the results derived from empirical asset pricing models. Black 
(1993) considers the three-factor model to be a result of data mining because trial with 
a large number of potential explanatory variables is bound to produce something that 
looks “nice”. 
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In his paper Dempsey (2012) emphasises the problem of data mining by pointing out 
that “the trend of adding factors to better explain observed price behaviors has 
continued to dominate asset pricing theory”. Dempsey argues that “the simplest way 
to fit CAPM to the data is to replace the risk-free rate (typically the rate of return on 
short-term U.S. Treasury bonds) with some larger value, Rz, since that would adjust 
the intercept and explain the lower slope of the cross-sectional regressions”. Referring 
to the work of Black et al. (1972), he argues that “BJS use the data to calculate the 
required substitute rate, Rz, that offers the best fit. Mehrling (2007) describes Rz as a 
“statistical fix in search of a theoretical explanation”.  
 
In general, Dempsey (2012) wonders “why academic finance should be given to such 
a colossal commitment to data mining”. He makes a brilliant point by correctly 
arguing that “a good deal of finance is now an econometric exercise in mining data 
either for confirmation of a particular factor model or for the confirmation of 
deviations from a model’s prediction as anomalies”. The love affair with data mining 
emanates from the desire to support one’s prior convictions. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This note is about the ideas raised by Dempsey (2012) in relation to the CAPM and its 
extensions. Several conclusions are reached that are in agreement with the 
propositions put forward by Dempsey. The CAPM is an inadequate model but the 
extensions are still lacking. These models result from the extensive use of data mining 
and defunct theorising. It is also concluded that two pillars of the CAPM, EMH and 
REH, have failed.  
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It seems that academic finance will be in a better shape if we stop depending 
excessively on mathematical and econometric modelling and learn more from 
financial history and other social sciences. Finance, after all, is not physics and the 
CAPM is by no means Boyle’s Law.  
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